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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and RANDY 
COOMBS FORBES, individually and 
as guardians and natural parents 
Of NICOLE LYNN FORBES, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation, DON VanSTREETER,M.D., 
TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D., and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 20713 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
This Respondent concurs in the statement made by the 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Respondent concurs in the Statement of the Case, 
including the Statement of Facts as given in Appellant's Brief 
and, consequently, does not repeat the same here pursuant to Rule 
24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
St. Mark's Hospital argues that a correct application 
of the rules of construction of the statutes concerned leads to 
the conclusion that this action is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. Specifically, the intent of the 
legislature was to bar actions absolutely after four years from 
the date of the incident concerned with some limited exception. 
The construction of the statutes concerned by the District Court 
promotes the policies of allowing a reasonable time for the 
plaintiffs to act while reasonably limiting the time for such 
actions to be brought for the protection of health care 
providers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
At issue in this appeal is the interaction of §78-14-4 
and §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), in estab-
lishing a limitations period for medical negligence actions. It 
is clear that §78-14-4 provides that the action must be brought 
within two years of discovery of the injury "but not to exceed 
four years after the alleged act of negligence." 
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A problem arises because §78-14-8 requires that a 
Notice of Intent to commence an action must be served at least 
ninety (90) days prior to the filing of a suit. The statute 
provides that if the Notice is served with less than 90 days left 
on "the applicable time period" that the time for filing an 
action is extended 120 days from the date of service of the 
Notice, 
Plaintiffs served their Notice of Intent one (1) day 
before the two years after discovery period ran and 101 days 
prior to the running of the 4-year limitation period. Their suit 
was filed 113 days after the Notice to Commence Action was served 
and 12 days after the 4-year limitation period ran. 
Plaintiffs attempt to put at issue the phrase in §78-
14—8r which refers to the "applicable time period". The plain-
tiffs contend that the applicable time period is the 2-year 
limitations period which, when the 120 days is added, would allow 
them to file suit after the 4-year period has run. 
This Respondent asserts that the Court need not be 
particularly concerned with determining the meaning of the phrase 
"applicable time period". What the District Court placed at 
issue with its decision is whether the limitations statutes cut 
off a claim at 4 years even though the plaintiffs were within a 
120 day extension upon the two-year period. 
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The choices available to the Court for resolution of 
this action are: 
A. The 120 day extension may be added to the two-
year period and allowed to extend beyond the four-year 
1 imitations period. 
B. The 120 day extension only applies to those 
plaintiffs which file with less than 90 days left on the four-
year period and is not added to the two-year limitation period as 
not being the "applicable time period". 
C. The 120 day extension may be added to either the 
two-year or four-year limitations periods but an extension on the 
two-year period may not extend beyond the four-year limitations 
period. 
The appellants have taken the position stated in A, 
above. It is believed the other respondents address position 
B. This respondent supports the resolution stated in C. 
If the 2-year limitations period with an additional 120 
days is allowed to exceed the 4-year limitations period, as 
Appellant claims, the plain language of §78-14-4, to the effect 
that no action is to exceed 4 years from the date of the incident 
must be ignored. Recognizing that this plain language must be 
given effect, the District Court found that the action must be 
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filed before the 4-year period ran where the Notice of Intent is 
served more than 90 days prior to the running of the 4-year 
period, 
II. 
APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Any of the three resolutions available to the Court 
identified above arise from and will result in some conflict 
between the actual language of §78-14-4 and §78-14-8 under the 
facts of this case. If the Appellant's position is adopted, the 
language of §78-14-4 limiting all actions to four years will 
remain in conflict. Conversely, if this Respondent's position is 
adopted, the 120 day extension provided in §78-14-8 will be 
limited to the four-year period and will not be a full 120 
days. Consequently, this Court must determine which of these 
choices is the better resolution. 
Certain established rules exist to assist in harmoniz-
ing statutes which appear to be in conflict. Those rules will 
assist this Court in resolving whether §78-14-8 should be allowed 
to create an exception to the rule of §78-14-4 which limits these 
malpractice actions to four years. 
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B. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
The Utah Code provides its own fundamental rule of 
construction in §68-3-2. (See Appendix for complete text) That 
statute provides for liberal construction of the statutes "to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice". 
A similar rule of construction developed out of case 
law from this Court. The Court has stated that its "primary 
responsibility" in construing legislation is to give an effect to 
legislative intent. American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1984). A similar concern was expressed in Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. Salt Lake City, 659 P.2d 
• • • • • • • • • • • • . * • • • • • nl • — • • I « • •• • • • • • • i n f • •• • • i • ,• .. — i i • • • • i m • • •• mi . I i i - . . 1 . » • • - . l •• i 1  i m • i m i - * » 
1030 (Utah 1983)^ when the Court considered the construction of 
tax collection statutes and stated that the "fundamental consid-
eration was legislative intent". 
Another important rule of construction is found in 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)r wherein the Court 
considered statutes apparently in conflict and applied the rule 
that statutes should be harmonized so far as possible. 
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III. 
UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION, 
THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The legislative intent in adopting §78-14-4 and §78-14-
8 is not difficult to discern because of the express statement of 
intent found in §78-14-2. See Appendix for text. Specifically/ 
the Legislature expressed a concern over the number of lawsuits 
against health care providers and the resulting cost of 
malpractice insurance which ultimately reduces the availability 
of medical services to the citizens of Utah. The statute 
identifies certain purposes to be accomplished by the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, of which the limitation statutes are 
part. Those purposes include that injured parties have a 
reasonable time to commence an action while limiting that time to 
specific periods to enable health care providers to reasonably 
calculate and anticipate tort exposure. 
Other governing principles ought to be considered in 
construing the statutes. First, in regulating health care mat-
ters, the Legislature is acting under its police power to protect 
the public health and welfare. Consequently, construction should 
be liberally made toward the purposes expressed. See, Stone v. 
Department of Registration, 567 P. 2d 1115 (Utah 1977). Second, 
the purpose of the Notice of Intent requirement is to give the 
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parties an opportunity to discuss and resolve the potential claim 
in order to avoid unnecessary expensive litigation. Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
In light of the rules of construction, the legislative 
intent, and the applicable purposes to be accomplished by the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the better construction of §78-
14-4 and §78-14-8 is that the 120 day extension added to a two-
year limitation period is cut off by the 4-year limitation 
period. 
That the 4-year limitation period cuts off the 120 day 
extension added to a 2-year period is the better view is shown by 
the accomplishment of several things. First, the express lan-
guage of §78-14-4 stating that actions are to be filed within 
four years is fully applied. Second, the intent to reasonably 
limit actions is met. The plaintiffs had a reasonable opportun-
ity (two years and 101 days) to file their action. The purpose 
of having sufficient time to discuss and resolve the claim has 
been accomplished. Third, conflict between the two statutes is 
minimized because no new exception to the rule of filing within 
four years is created. 
Recognition of cutting off the 120 day extension added 
to the 2-year limitations period at the 4-year limitations cre-
ates only a very limited exception to the 120 day rule expressed 
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in §78-14-8, No abrogation of the intent of the statutes to 
provide a reasonable time for filing the suit while balancing the 
need of health care providers to be protected occurs. 
Recognition of the plaintiffs' position that the 120 
day period added to the 2-year limitation can extend beyond the 
4-year limitation is a construction away from the intent to 
reasonably limit these actions. The effect would be to create a 
new exception for all cases which had the 2-year after discovery 
period end during the time period of 120 to 91 days before the 4-
year period ended. 
It is important to keep in mind when considering a 
limitations problem that at issue is the end of the opportunity 
to litigate a question. Plaintiffs had two years and 101 days to 
file their action. Therefore, the enforcement of the 4-year 
limitations period works no injustice because of the reasonable 
opportunity to act. 
Appellants suggest a hypothetical situation in their 
Brief which is alleged to demonstrate the injustice worked by the 
District Court's ruling. See Appellant's Brief, p. 9. There 
will always be some unusual circumstances to consider when the 
law engages in line drawing. No statute can fully and adequately 
anticipate all circumstances which may arise. For example, under 
the construction suggested by the plaintiffs, if a plaintiff 
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served a Notice of Intent 91 days before the 2-year period ran, 
only one day would be available to file the action. Under the 
construction proposed by this defendant, an additional 1D1 days 
was available. 
Rather than engage in the consideration of hypothetical 
evils, this Court need consider only the facts of this case and 
weigh the relative competing interests of the parties in light of 
the rules of construction. Again, the plaintiffs had a 
reasonable opportunity to bring their suit before the 4-year 
period ran and the public policies legitimately expressed by the 
Legislature are fulfilled by the defendants proposed 
construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Under either the Appellants1 or the Respondent's argu-
ments, this Court must choose between some resulting inconsisten-
cies in the language of the statutes concerned. The Appellants 
would have the Court create an exception to the absolute language 
of §78-14-4 that malpractice actions are not to extend beyond 
four years after the date of the incident giving rise to the 
claim. The Respondent's argument contained herein would have the 
Court limit the 120 day extension of the 2-year period to a 
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maximum of the 4-year limitations period. The decision of the 
District Court to strictly apply the 4-year rule is the better 
view because it allows the plaintiffs to have had a reasonable 
time after discovery of the injury to file their suit while 
promoting the policies sought to be implemented by the statutes 
concerned. The Judgment of the District Court was, therefore, 
reasonable in light of the total picture of fact and applicable 
law. The District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1985. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
ARMAN E. KIPP// 
GREGoS?7/. SANDERS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
St. Markfs Hospital 
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Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
P. Keith Nelson, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street 
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APPENDIX 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed— 
Rules of equity prevail.—The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the 
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all 
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is 
any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law 
in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—The 
legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for dam-
ages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care 
has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the in-
surance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims 
is increased care cost, both through the health care providers passing the 
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing de-
fensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a 
lawsuit. Further,, certain health care providers are discouraged from con-
tinuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavail-
ability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the 
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care 
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures 
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a 
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it be-
comes unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which profes-
sional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately cal-
culated ; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evalua-
tion and settlement of claims. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No mal-
practice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, except that 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that 
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence 
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; 
and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the 
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discov-
ered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minor-
ity or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the 
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and cor-
porations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under 
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may 
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; 
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years 
after the effective date of this act. 
78-14-8, Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against 
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the pro-
spective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice 
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of 
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occur-
rence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of 
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages 
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the man-
ner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in 
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such 
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action 
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior 
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the mal-
practice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed 
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall 
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care 
provider. 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr•, Esq, (1356) 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581) 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
175 South West Temple 
Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Don Van Steeter, M. D. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and 
RANDY COOMBS FORBES in-
dividually and as guardians 
and natural parents of 
NICOLE LYNN FORBES, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
ST, MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation, DON VAN STEETER, 
M. D w TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M* D* , 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
HON. JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Civil No. C-85-1531 
This matter has come on for hearing before the Court, 
Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding by designation, on April 
29, 1985, on defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment 
on t h e ground t h a t t h i s a c t i o n was barred by § 73-14-4 , Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended.) 
P l a i n t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d by Bryan L. McDougal, 
Esq . ; defendant Van S t e e t e r by S t e w a r t M. Hanson , J r . , E s q . ; 
defendant S t . Mark's Hosp i t a l by Gregory J . Sanders , Esq. ; defendant 
Toyota by P. Keith Nelson, Esq. 
The C o u r t , h av ing hea rd t h e a r g u m e n t s of c o u n s e l , 
reviewed the r e s p e c t i v e memoranda s u b m i t t e d on b e h a l f of t h e 
p a r t i e s , e n t e r e d i t s Memorandum Decis ion g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t s 1 
motions on Apr i l 30, 1985, and being o t h e r w i s e a d v i s e d in t h e 
p remises , now e n t e r s i t s Judgment as fo l lows : 
I t i s hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDJED AND DECREED that judgment shall 
be, and hereby is, entered in favor of all defendants and against 
plaintiff, no cause of action. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of May, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER 
District Judge 
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I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g Judgment 
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t h e U. S. M a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o : 
BRYAN L. McDOUGAL, ESQ. 
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f s 
2 61 E a s t Broadway 
S u i t e #150 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Carman E. Kipp , Esq . 
G r e g o r y J . S a n d e r s , Esq . 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P . C. 
A t t o r n e y s for Defendan t 
S t . M a r k ' s H o s p i t a l 
3 2 Exchange P l a c e 
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P . K e i t h N e l s o n , Esq . 
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50 South Main 
S u i t e #700 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and : 
RANDY COOMBS FORBES, individ-
ually and as guardians and : 
natural parents of NICHOLE 
LYNN FORBES, : 
Plaintiffs, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. : CIVIL NO. C 85-1531 
ST. MARKS1S HOSPITAL, a Utah 
corporation, DONALD VAN 
STREETER, M.D., TOSHIKO TOYOTA, : 
M.D., and JOHN DOES 1 through 
20, 
Defendants. : 
Defendants seek summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs1 
Complaint by reason of the Statute of Limitations (78-14-4). 
This statute provides that "No malpractice action may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff 
... discovered the injury ... but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act . . ." . This seems clear 
enough and would not present any problem if it were not for 
the fact that 78-14-8 provides a notice requirement. The 
notice requirement means, (1) that no suit can be commenced 
until at least 90 days after serving the notice, (2) the notice 
can be served any time before the statute of limitations has 
run, and (3) if it is served less than 90 days before the 
FORBES, ET AL V. 
ST. MARKS, ET AL. PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
statute of limitation expires it extends the time for filing 
suit for a period of 120 days from the time of the service 
of the "notice". The notice in this case would extend the 
two year statute of limitation to 3/20/85. It would not extend 
the four year period because it was not served "less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period" which this court finds to be the four year term as 
to that extension thus the four year term would expire on 
3/1/85. This issue then becomes whether or not the extension 
of the two year period to 3/20/85 takes precedence over the 
four year period expiring 3/1/85. This action was filed on 
3/12/85. This court holds that 78-14-4 intended to fix a 
definite cut off date of four years subject to an extension 
of 120 days if the notice is filed "within" 90 days prior 
to that cut off date. 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the case dismissed. 
Dated this ^ & day of April, 1985. 
DEAN E. CONDER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies mailed to counsel 
